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Recent research by Latin American economists on policies to promote 
industrial development suggests a number of areas of broad consensus and 
Chers in which further research would be valuable. Five areas of 
investigation are discussed below. 
1. Selective Use of Incentive Packages 
Although some authors continue to recommend across the board 
liberalization, involving non-discriminating or zero levels of effective 
protection, there is broad support for strategies that rely on the selective 
use of multiple incentives. Such a strategy combines fiscal, trade, exchange 
rate and other policies to selectively promote industries of high potential or 
high priority. The latter approach reflects a structuralist view 
rigidities in Latin American economies impede a smooth 
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response to market signais and can even result in perverse results. 
Neo-liberal and structuralist approaches may not be conceptually incompatible; 
one could propose that an optimal industrial strategy is one that permits the 
transmission of market signais, particularly from the rest of the world, but 
intervenes selectively to remove or compensate for rigidities that prevent an 
appropriate supply response. Some would also argue for interventions that 
would modify or supplement market signais with those conducive to desired 
patterns of income distribution, preservation of national culture, 
environmental sustainability, and others. The latter concerns are voiced less 
frequently during the current situation period of macroeconomic crisis. 
While there is broad interest in the selective use of incentive packages, 
neither experience nor theory provide much guidance about the design of 
packages that are effective, internally consistent and not excessively costly. 
The development of methodologies for the design and evaluation of alternative 
policy packages is an area to which researchers and research funding agencies 
should give high priority. While such studies may be difficult, it is certain 
that policy makers will continue to manipulate these instruments, with or 
without information about the relationships among them or their effects. It 
is clearly desirable to make such decisions based on reliable information. 
Research on the design of policy packages could proceed in four stages: 
a) the selection of criteria by which to evaluate policy instruments and 
policy packages. 
b) analysis of the effects of existing policies and simulation of the 
effects of alternatives, according to the criteria established in (a). 
c) estimation of values for the criteria in (a). 
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d) design of policy packages that include both incentives and mechanisms 
to compensate groups negatively affected. 
Each of these elements is discussed below. 
a) Selection of criteria 
Two types of criteria are suggested. Abril and Urriola (1987) suggest a 
series of broad objectives for industrial policy; packages can be evaluated by 
the degree to which the objectives are met. These include export performance, 
generation of net foreign exchange earnings/savings, employment generation, 
and use of domestic resources. 
A narrower type of criterion is that applied to the selection of 
individual instruments to achieve these objectives. Policy instruments should 
have, inter alia, the following characteristics: 
i transparency: the existence and cost of a policy measure should be 
clearly visible. 
ii) administrative feasibility: the measure should not be so complex as 
to overtax the administrative capacity of the agency responsible; nor 
should the sum of measures adopted require excessive co-ordination. 
iii) flexibility: the policy measures should not "freeze" a given 
structure of production; they should permit adaptation to external 
shocks and new opportunities and be themselves susceptible to 
modification or repeal. 
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b) Analysis of existing and potential policies 
This aspect of research is of such scope that an adequate treatment is not 
possible here. Much valuable methodological work in this area is being 
carried out by CIEPLAN in Chile. Suffice it to say that a combination of 
techniques is desirable, including macro, sectoral and micro (firm level) 
models, input/output tables, surveys and interviews at the firm level. Much 
will depend on the extent of existing information, the skills of the 
researcher team and the resources available to it. 
c) Estimation of values for criteria 
Assigning values to the criteria by which policy packages are evaluated is 
important in that most policy alternatives will not be fully satisfactory - 
they will fall short with respect to one or more criteria. How can policy 
makers evaluate and compare an alternative which performs well in category A 
but poorly in B, with one that does the reverse. Assigning prices or values 
to the variables would permit objective comparison. 
For many criteria, standard techniques exist. For example, it is not 
difficult to estimate the cost of creating an additional job in a particular 
industry, thus permitting a comparison of performance in revenue generation 
vs. employment generation. Domestic resource cost (DRC) is another broadly 
applicable technique. Depending on the criteria selected, some development of 
new techniques may be required. In any case, the weighting given to each 
criteria by policy makers will be influenced by the political process. 
Economic analysis can provide a standard against which outcomes can be 
measured, but realistically one cannot expect it to be decisive. 
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d) Design of compensatory mechanisms 
This task is likely to require more conceptual work than the previous and 
will involve political economy research rather than a poorly economic 
approach. The purpose and importance of such work is discussed below. 
Altering the current mix of industrial policy incentives will obviously 
affect more that the pattern of production; it will also affect the 
distribution of income to capital and labour in different industries, as their 
relative profitability changes. One can logically expect the groups affected 
to react through the political process, including direct pressure on the 
relevant government agencies. 
It is likely, in fact, that this political process explains much of the 
complexity of the incentive structure in Latin America*. While the use of 
multiple incentives no doubt reflects in part the structuralist orientation of 
technicians in the state apparatus, this is insufficient explanation in 
itself. The baroque complexity and frequent lack of internal consistency 
probably reflects in part a lack of coordination among the agencies 
responsible for fiscal policy, trade policy, exchange rates and the like; in 
part the differing interests among semi-autonomous agencies; and in part the 
process by which economic agents react politically to changes in policy. 
-------------------- 
* For example, in Ecuador between 1972 and 1981 the number of lines of credit 
provided to industry by the public sector increased from 26 to 58, with 
nominal interest rates covering a range of 2%-15%(Abril and Urriola, 1987). 
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Imagine a scenario in which the Central Bank devalues the local currency. 
Firms whose profits may be negatively affected by devaluation then petition 
the Central Bank to revoke the decision or, depending on where they can most 
effectively exert their influence, petition for a change in taxation or 
tariffs that will compensate for the damage done by the change in the exchange 
rate. The next step will be for firms which favoured the devaluation to 
counter-react through a similar variety of channels. In this way, a complex 
structure of incentives is established and expanded. If the reaction process 
is effective, the net effect of these "incentives" packages may be nil or 
impossible to identify. 
In other words, industrial and related macro policy measures are 
simultaneously incentives and mechanisms of compensation. This process 
highlights the importance of an approach to the design of compensatory 
mechanisms based more on objective economic analysis and less on the political 
process. 
As in the application of multiple incentives per se, policy makers will 
continue to manipulate these instruments as part of daily life, whether they 
have a precise awareness of their impact or not. It would clearly be 
preferable to consciously design mechanisms based on an accurate analysis of 
their cost and effects. In theory, the results should be superior in ternis of 
efficiency (e.g. Pareto optimality) while accomplishing the necessary tasks of 
overcoming political resistance and providing legitimate compensation for the 
colts borne by particular groups. While researchers should continue to 
persuade politicians to think more like economists, economists might from time 
to time be persuaded to think more like politicians. 
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Similarly, attention should be given to the appropriate sequencing of 
changes in a given policy package. There is considerable interest in the 
literature in optimal sequencing from a technical point of view (e.g. 
Foxley, 1980)*. More attention could also be given to the relative merits of 
alternative sequences in terms of political feasibility. It may be that a 
particular series of changes may successively neutralize opponents and 
strengthen supporters in such a way as to permit the implementation of the 
overall package. 
There are some indications that the kind of political process described 
above has diminished in importance in Latin America during the macroeconomic 
crisis of the 1980's, as sectoral and specialized state agencies lose their 
relative autonomy to macro policy makers in the Central Bank and Planning 
Ministry. At least, this appears to have occurred in small countries such as 
Ecuador and Uruguay. Whether this is a general phenomenon that diminishes the 
importance of political economy approaches is a question that merits 
investigation. 
A final comment relevant to the use of multiple incentives has to do with 
legal constraints on policy changes (e.g. licensing, regulation, incorporation 
of enterprises, labour legislation). These legal structures are often built 
up in the saure way as economic incentives and can rival the latter in ternis of 
* It is now recognized, for example, that the import response to devaluation 
is generally more rapid than the export response and that import controls 
should best be maintained until export revenue cornes onstream. 
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complexity and internat inconsistency. They tend to be even more difficult to 
alter. 
2. Dynamic Comparative Advantage 
While controversy still exists over the desirability of the selective use 
of multiple incentives, there appears to be a consensus that considerations of 
d ynamic comparative advantage (DCA) rather than static comparative advantage 
(SCA) should guide trade and industrial policy*. However, unless economists 
can insert some analytical content into this concept and provide guidance 
about how to achieve it, there is a danger that DCA will become a mere slogan, 
used indiscriminately to justify protectionist policies. 
In fact, economists have never developed an effective methodology to 
identify SCA , a priori or even ex post. Today we are all apostles of 
something infinitely more subtle -DCA- without ever having resolved the 
methodological problems associated with its ideological predecessor. 
------------------------------ ------------------------------ 
*It is interesting to note, for example, the relative lack of current interest 
in a subject that provided the material for countless PhD theses in the 1960's 
and 70's: regional integration. This lack of interest may reflect the 
tendency of such agreements as the Andean Pact to "freeze" the pattern of 
industrial production, impeding flexible response to changing opportunities. 
Once country A agrees to produce refrigerators and country B computers, it is 
difficult to change the agreement without long and difficult negotiations. 
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This is not so much a criticism as an indication of where increased effort 
could be put. For example, there is considerable opportunity for 
cross-fertilization between those who study industrial organization and firm 
behaviour and the incipient literature on strategic trade theory and DCA. 
What, precisely, is DCA? What determines it? Can it be created, encouraged, 
controlled? If so, how, at what cost, and with what implications for macro 
policy? 
The management of a development strategy based on DCA is important 
because, while the approach presents many opportunities it also has dangers. 
DCA is by definition temporary: international markets contain many short terra 
opportunities which can disappear rapidly with changes in demand and 
technology and the entry of new competitors. Unless the revenue from 
DCA-based industries is well managed, the result could be cycles of boom and 
bust equal in severity to those derived from reliance on the export of raw 
materials. 
In other words, an industrial strategy based on the promotion of DCA 
should not focus exclusively on technology policy. It also requires careful 
management of revenue, public sector employment, fiscal policy and other 
measures relevant to export orientation. 
3. The Services Sector 
Empirical studies (Abril and Urriola, 1987; Schydlowsky, 1987) suggest 
that exchange rate policy may be less important to potential exporters or 
import substituters than other factors. For example, devaluation frequently 
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does not induce local manufacturers to increase their use of local inputs, 
because of problems of quality, timely delivery, or awareness of suppliers. 
Similarly, potential exporters may be hampered by lack of market information, 
poor communications media, insufficient lines of credit, and the like, more 
than by overvalued exchange rates. These traditional structuralist arguments 
are increasingly being supported by empirical, firm level data. 
At the saine time, even a casual observer notes the dramatic difference 
between the size and efficiency of the services sector in SE Asia and that of 
Latin America (banks, telephone, telex, postal service, airports, frequency 
and reliability of flights, etc.). There appears to be a correlation between 
a strong services sector and a strong export-orientated manufacturing sector. 
Which of these is the chicken and which the egg is harder to say. Research 
may support the hypothesis that strengthening services and ancillary 
industries is a more effective way of supporting manufacturing than heavy 
reliance on manipulation of macro prices. If so, governments could look for 
ways to improve the flow of information within the economy and to link firms 
in the format and informai sector. The experience of the Philippines in 
establishing "clearing houses" for industriel subcontracting would be worth 
investigating. 
4. Income Distribution and Employment 
Some recent experiments in reorienting production tend to undermine 
traditional arguments from both the left and right with respect to the 
relationship between employment and income distribution. 
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The Alan Garcia government in Peru redistributed income through a change 
in relative prices, including a significant increase in agricultural prices, 
in an attempt to promote a demand-driven reactivation, However, the 
consumption effect was for greater than the short term effect on domestic 
supply, resulting in a resurgence of inflation and a flood of food imports. 
In Uruguay, liberalization resulted in a dramatic improvement in export 
performance (Macadar, 1987). Exports increased from 5% of GDP in 1982 to 45% 
at present. However, in spite of the labour-intensive nature of these 
manufactured exports, and a persistently high rate of out-migration, 
employment dropped severely rather than increasing. At the saine, economic 
analysis undermines the traditional argument of the left, that redistribution 
of income would generate an increase in dem and for locally produced goods and 
an upward spiral of production and consumption. This appears highly unlikely, 
since products consumed by low income groups (e.g. food and clothing) are 
produced by capital intensive methods in Uruguay; an increase in their 
production would generate little employment. While the Peruvian problem was 
short term, that of Uruguay is longer term. 
The Uruguayan situation in particular seems to support the call for 
increased research on the relationship between income distribution and 
employment, centered on product/employment elasticities and the demand 
characteristics of labour intensive products and particular types of firms 
(e.g. small/medium/large enterprise) (Berry, 1987; Little, et al 1987). 
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5. Transnational Corporations (TNC's) 
TNC's, a fashionable subject during the 1970's, have all but disappeared 
from the literature during the macro crisis of the 80's. This may not be 
entirely appropriate. A reappraisal of the potential contribution of TNC's is 
called for - perhaps in providing access to export markets, rather than 
capital or technology. It is also worth examining how these firms are 
affected by the system of incentives: perhaps quite differently from local 
firms. 
Summar 
Understandably, considerable attention has been devoted to macroeconomic 
policy in Latin America, particularly with respect to short term adjustment. 
The depth and persistence of the crisis indicates that short term policies are 
unlikely to provide a solution. Furthermore, the effect of combinations of 
macro policies on the pattern of production cannot be easily predicted on the 
basis of current information. More research is needed at less aggregate 
levels about the effects of the multiplicity of macro and sectoral policies on 
the industrial sector, with a view to longer terni issues of production, 
em ployment and income distribution. 
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